|
Build up and Aftermath
Benjamin Disraeli
Like so many imperial conflicts of the period, the Zulu War was not initiated from London. Instead,
Benjamin Disraeli's government - preoccupied with the Russian threat to Constantinople and Afghanistan - made every
effort to avoid a fight. 'We cannot now have a Zulu war, in addition to other greater and too possible troubles',
wrote Sir Michael Hicks Beach, the colonial secretary, in November 1878.
The man to whom this letter was addressed - Sir Bartle Frere - had others ideas, however. Frere had been
sent out to to Cape Town with the specific task of grouping South Africa's hotch-potch of British colonies, Boer
republics and independent black states into a Confederation of South Africa. But he quickly realised that the region
could not be unified under British rule until the powerful Zulu kingdom - with its standing army of
40,000 disciplined warriors - had been suppressed.
So he exaggerated the threat posed by the Zulus to the British, and, when the home government refused to sanction war,
took matters into his own hands in December 1878 by presenting the Zulu king, Cetshwayo, with an unacceptable ultimatum.
This required, among other things, the disbandment of the Zulu Army, and war was the inevitable result.
'Such unilateral action by an imperial pro-consul was not unusual during the Victorian period. '
Such unilateral action by an imperial pro-consul was not unusual during the Victorian period. So great were the distances
involved, and so slow the methods of communication, that British governors often took it upon themselves to start
wars and annex provinces. Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, was about to invade Afghanistan without reference to
London. But the Zulu conflict was unique in that it was to be the last pre-emptive war launched by the British,
prior to the recent campaign in Iraq.
Lord Chelmsford
The war began on 11 January 1879, when the 5,000-strong main British column invaded Zululand at Rorke's Drift.
It was commanded by the ambitious Lord Chelmsford, a favourite of the Queen, who had little respect for the fighting
qualities of the Zulu. 'If I am called upon to conduct operations against them,' he wrote in July 1878, 'I shall strive to be in
a position to show them how hopelessly inferior they are to us in fighting power, altho' numerically stronger.'
This dangerous mixture of self-confidence and contempt for their foes infected the whole British force.
But their misjudgement came to rebound on them badly.
By 20 January - hampered by minor skirmishes and poor tracks - Chelmsford's column had only advanced 11 miles
to the rocky lower slopes of a distinctive, sphinx-like hill called Isandlwana. There it set up camp. But at 4am on 22 January,
Chelmsford made the first of a series of blunders by taking two-thirds of his force off to pursue what he believed
was the main Zulu army. He was convinced that the Zulus were gathering to the south-east, and so failed to reconnoitre
adequately the broken ground to the north-east.
There, lying in wait just five miles from the exposed camp at Isandlwana, were 20,000 Zulu warriors.
At around 8am, mounted vedettes reported large numbers of Zulus on the high ground to the left of the camp.
Colonel Pulleine, in command at Isandlwana, dashed off a quick note to Chelmsford, reading: 'Report just come in that the
Zulus are advancing in force from Left front of Camp.' Chelmsford read it shortly after 9.30am, and he returned it to his
staff officer, Major Clery, without a word, and would not be deflected from his original plan.
'This dangerous mixture of self-confidence and contempt for their foes infected the whole British force. '
At 11am, by which time the 1,300 men remaining in the camp had been swelled by 450 reinforcements, mounted scouts
stumbled upon the concealed Zulu impi. Realising they had been spotted, the Zulus rose as one and began their attack,
using their traditional tactic of encirclement known as the izimpondo zankomo ('horns of the buffalo').
An hour later, as the hard-pressed British defenders fought for their lives, a portion of Chelmsford's force at Mangeni Falls
received word that the camp was in danger of being overrun. On his own initiative a Colonel Harness gave orders for his
small force of artillery and infantry to return to camp. But it had only progressed half a mile when a staff officer rode up with
express orders from Chelmsford to resume its original march because the message was a false alarm.
The last chance to save the camp had been thrown away.
By 3pm, despite severe losses, the Zulus had captured the camp. The culmination of Chelmsford's incompetence was a
blood-soaked field littered with thousands of corpses. Of the original 1,750 defenders - 1,000 British and
750 black auxiliaries - 1,350 had been killed.
Word of the disaster reached Britain on 11 February 1879. The Victorian public was dumbstruck by the news that
'spear-wielding savages' had defeated the well equipped British Army. The hunt was on for a scapegoat, and Chelmsford
was the obvious candidate. But he had powerful supporters.
Queen Victoria
On 12 March 1879 Disraeli told Queen Victoria that his 'whole Cabinet had wanted to yield to the clamours of the
Press, & Clubs, for the recall of Ld. Chelmsford'. He had, however, 'after great difficulty carried the day'. Disraeli was
protecting Chelmsford not because he believed him to be blameless for Isandlwana, but because he was under intense
pressure to do so from the Queen.
Many generals blunder in war, but few go to such lengths to avoid responsibility.
Meanwhile Lord Chelmsford was urgently burying all the evidence that could be used against him. He propagated the
myth that a shortage of ammunition led to defeat at Isandlwana. He ensured that potential witnesses to his errors were
unable to speak out. Even more significantly, he tried to push blame for the defeat onto Colonel Durnford, now dead,
claiming that Durnford had disobeyed orders to defend the camp.'Many generals blunder in war, but few go to
such lengths to avoid responsibility.'The truth is that no orders were ever given to Durnford to take command.
Chelmsford's behaviour, in retrospect, is unforgivable.
Chelmsford's Recall
Back in England meanwhile - with the Zulu War no nearer to being won - the cries for Chelmsford's recall intensifying.
On 23 May, realising that his political future was on the line, Disraeli told the queen that his government was replacing
Chelmsford with Wolseley. She replied frostily: 'I will not withhold my sanction though I cannot approve it.
' It was one of the few serious breeches she and Disraeli had during their political relationship.
'Most of what Chelmsford told the Queen was a pack of lies.'
In early September, shortly after his return from South Africa, Lord Chelmsford was given an audience with the Queen.
She recorded the conversation in her journal:
'Ld. Chelmsford said no doubt poor Col. Durnford had disobeyed orders, in leaving the camp as he did...
Ld. Chelmsford knew nothing, Col. Durnford never having sent any message to say he was in danger... This much is clear to me:
viz. that it was not his fault, but that of others, that this surprise at Sandlwana took place... I told Ld. Chelmsford he had been
blamed by many, and even by the Government, for commencing the war without sufficient cause. He replied that he believed
it to have been quite inevitable; that if we had not made war when we did, we should have been attacked and possibly overpowered.'
Most of what Chelmsford told the Queen was a pack of lies. Durnford, as we have seen, did not disobey orders. And
Chelmsford ignored at least two warnings to the effect the camp 'was in danger'. In addition, the war was not one
of self-defence but of conquest. Queen Victoria, however, would not see the truth.
Only one winner
The British captured King Cetshwayo in August 1879, and the war, to all intents and purposes, was over. But few
emerged on the British side with any credit, nor did ordinary Zulus benefit. Cetshwayo was exiled, Zululand was broken up
and eventually annexed. Frere never achieved his ambition to confederate South Africa. That would have to wait until the
aftermath of an even bloodier conflict, that of the Boer War.
'James Dalton died in 1887, a broken man.'
Disraeli lost the 1880 election and died the following year. James Dalton died in 1887, a broken man. Many of the
lower-rank VC winners from Rorke's Drift were also forgotten when the media circus moved on.
But one man prospered - Lord Chelmsford. The Queen showered honours on him, promoting him to full general,
awarding him the Gold Stick at Court and appointing him Lieutenant of the Tower of London.
He died in 1905, at the age of 78, playing billiards at his club
|